![]() With Ford ECUs, you get a DLL from Ford Motor and a key. For example, you can't easily change the ODO (odometer) value. The really sensitive stuff typically requires what is known as a VIN unlocker. Automotive manufacturers are not allowed to lock out small mom & pop service shops or 3rd party tools. They are part of what is known as right to service. The UDS hacks they talk about are not really hacks at all. You can flood a CAN bus with CAN frames using an ArbID of 0x01 or 0x00 to kick off a sort of denial of service attack. ![]() ![]() ArbID on CAN is not only unique to CAN frame but also used to win arbitration. Why not talk about CAN arbitration? The book fails to mention a simple attack vector everyone in automotive knows about. The book spends an inordinate amount of its pages talking about stuff you can easily google and get much more detailed and more accurate information like LIN, ODB2, etc. Infotainment systems, generally speaking, are not even on the same CAN bus as the engine control unit. Ford SYNC, for example, required signed payloads. The attacks in the book are low grade attacks just about anyone with just a basic curiosity could probably pull off - like making up a cable. Example, there is now CAN-FD but they only talk about CAN and Extended CAN in the book. I do too I was a lead on Ford SYNC, GM's Cadillac CUE, and a slew of other OEM ECU modules.
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